CDN and DNS · DENIC
DENIC .de DNSSEC outage
- Started
- May 5, 2026, 19:57 UTC
- Resolved
- May 5, 2026, 23:15 UTC
- Duration
- 3h 18m (from provider timestamps)
- Affected
- .de DNS resolution via validating resolvers (signed and unsigned .de domains)
- Cause
- Final reviewDuring a routine ZSK rollover, faulty code in DENIC's in-house rollover agent generated a separate key pair for each of three HSMs instead of one shared pair, all with key tag 33834. Only one matching DNSKEY was published, so only about a third of signatures validated. Validating resolvers treated .de delegations as bogus, so even unsigned .de domains failed to resolve, and monitoring alerts that caught the errors were not processed in time.
- Was it an attack?
- No, per the provider or investigators
- State
- resolved
Anatomy
1. Trigger
Certificate or key
2. Already broken
Latent bug, Missing validation
3. What made it spread
DNS dependency
4. Blast radius
national: Germany (.de TLD, global resolvers)
5. Cause category
DNS
Labels follow the root-cause taxonomy. A person's change is recorded as the trigger and the missing safeguard as what was already broken; “human error” is never a cause here.
How the explanation changed
May 5, 2026 · No cause stated
“The root cause of the disruption has not yet been fully identified.”
DENIC: DENIC reports DNSSEC disruption affecting .de domains (5 May 2026)
May 6, 2026 · Preliminary cause
“The outage is linked to a routine, scheduled key rollover. During this process, non-validatable signatures were generated and distributed.”
DENIC: Technical issue with .de domains resolved (6 May 2026)
May 8, 2026 · Preliminary cause
“Consequently, for the same “key tag” (33834), three different key pairs were generated instead of a single one, of which only the public key of a single pair was stored in the DNSKEY RR, meaning that only about a third of the RRSIG RRs could be validated.”
DENIC: Analysis of the DNS outage on 5 May 2026 (8 May 2026, addendum 11 May)
June 11, 2026 · Final review
“The actual cause was an error in the software code of an in-house development that controls a rollover agent. Its task is to generate key material and load it into all connected HSMs.”
What the provider committed to change
- Additional alerting, including on the continuously running testing and validation tools
- Accelerated procedure to provide a valid zone backup in an emergency
- Partial validation of the zone before deployment
- Suspend further ZSK rollovers until development security and test coverage are improved
- External security and process analysis
- Code review process improvements (already implemented)
Impact, as reported
- share of signatures that validated: about one third, according to DENIC eG (DENIC: Final Report: DNS Outage of 5 May 2026 (11 Jun 2026)).
Every figure is attributed to whoever stated it. Crowd reports are labelled user reports and never treated as users affected.
Attack or not
“No signs of compromise or attacks on the signing system or other DENIC infrastructure”
DENIC eG, June 11, 2026 (DENIC: Final Report: DNS Outage of 5 May 2026 (11 Jun 2026))
Post-incident reviews
- Preliminary review, May 8, 2026
- Final review, June 11, 2026
Sources
- DENIC: Final Report: DNS Outage of 5 May 2026 (11 Jun 2026) (provider, read November 17, 2026)
- DENIC: Analysis of the DNS outage on 5 May 2026 (8 May 2026, addendum 11 May) (provider, read November 17, 2026)
- DENIC: Technical issue with .de domains resolved (6 May 2026) (provider, read November 17, 2026)
- DENIC: DENIC reports DNSSEC disruption affecting .de domains (5 May 2026) (provider, read November 17, 2026)
- Cloudflare blog: When DNSSEC goes wrong: how we responded to the .de TLD outage (6 May 2026) (analysis, read November 17, 2026)
Last verified November 17, 2026. Spot an error? The methodology page says how corrections work.