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CDN and DNS · Cloudflare

Cloudflare BYOIP prefix withdrawal

Started
Feb 20, 2026, 17:56 UTC
Resolved
Feb 20, 2026, 23:03 UTC
Duration
5h 7m (from provider timestamps)
Affected
Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP), CDN and security services on BYOIP prefixes, Spectrum, Magic Transit, 1.1.1.1 website (one.one.one.one)
Cause
Final reviewA newly released cleanup sub-task, meant to remove BYOIP prefixes customers had asked to delete, called the Addressing API with a pending_delete flag that had no value. The API read the empty value as a request for all BYOIP prefixes, and the task began deleting them and their service bindings. Addressing API changes propagate straight to the edge, so about 1,100 prefixes were withdrawn from BGP before the task was stopped.
Was it an attack?
No, per the provider or investigators
State
resolved

Anatomy

  1. 1. Trigger

    Code deployment

  2. 2. Already broken

    Latent bug, Missing validation

  3. 3. What made it spread

    Global configuration propagation

  4. 4. Blast radius

    global: Global

  5. 5. Cause category

    Change or deployment

Labels follow the root-cause taxonomy. A person's change is recorded as the trigger and the missing safeguard as what was already broken; “human error” is never a cause here.

How the explanation changed

  1. February 21, 2026 · Final review

    “Because the client is passing pending_delete with no value, the result of Query().Get(“pending_delete”) here will be an empty string (“”), so the API server interprets this as a request for all BYOIP prefixes instead of just those prefixes that were supposed to be removed.”

    Cloudflare blog: Cloudflare outage on February 20, 2026

What the provider committed to change

  • Standardize the API schema so flags like pending_delete are validated
  • Separate operational state from configured state, with snapshots that can be rolled back to known-good
  • Circuit breaker that halts deployments on too-fast or too-broad prefix withdrawals or deletions

Impact, as reported

Every figure is attributed to whoever stated it. Crowd reports are labelled user reports and never treated as users affected.

Attack or not

“The issue was not caused, directly or indirectly, by a cyberattack or malicious activity of any kind.”

Cloudflare, February 21, 2026 (Cloudflare blog: Cloudflare outage on February 20, 2026)

Post-incident reviews

Other Cloudflare incidents

Sources

  1. Cloudflare blog: Cloudflare outage on February 20, 2026 (provider, read November 17, 2026)

Last verified November 17, 2026. Spot an error? The methodology page says how corrections work.