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secureSHA-3 · 256 bits · 2015

SHA3-256

Keccak under the SHA-3 banner: a totally different sponge construction from SHA-2, immune to length-extension by design.

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After SHA-1's weakness became clear, NIST ran a public competition (2007–2012) to pick the next hash standard. The winner (Keccak, by Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters, and Van Assche) was standardized as SHA-3 in 2015. Its internal sponge construction is structurally different from SHA-2's Merkle–Damgård design, which means length-extension attacks don't apply, and it's a useful insurance policy: if a theoretical break ever lands on SHA-2, SHA-3 doesn't fall with it. SHA-3 is slower than SHA-256 on CPUs with SHA-NI hardware acceleration, so SHA-2 is still the practical default for most work. Reach for SHA-3 when you want defense-in-depth or when you need the bonus modes Keccak enables (SHAKE-128/256 as a variable-length XOF, cSHAKE for domain separation, KMAC for MACs).

Recommended uses

  • ·Defense-in-depth (use alongside SHA-256 for separate signatures)
  • ·Variable-length output via SHAKE-128 / SHAKE-256
  • ·Domain-separated MACs via KMAC

Known attacks / caveats

  • ·None practical. Best academic attack reaches ~5 of 24 rounds.

Designed by

Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters, Van Assche (Keccak team), published 2015.

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Frequently asked questions

Is SHA3-256 secure in 2026?
Yes. SHA3-256 has no practical breaks as of 2026. Caveats worth knowing: None practical. Best academic attack reaches ~5 of 24 rounds.
What is SHA3-256 used for?
Defense-in-depth (use alongside SHA-256 for separate signatures). Variable-length output via SHAKE-128 / SHAKE-256. Domain-separated MACs via KMAC.
How long is the output of SHA3-256?
256 bits, which is 32 bytes, or 64 characters when written as hexadecimal. The length is fixed regardless of how large the input is.
Can SHA3-256 be used to hash passwords?
No, and this is the most consequential mistake people make with it. SHA3-256 is a fast general-purpose hash, and fast is exactly the wrong property for passwords: it lets an attacker with a stolen database test billions of guesses. Use a purpose-built password hashing function such as Argon2id instead.
Who created SHA3-256?
Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters, Van Assche (Keccak team), published in 2015.